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NOTES
THE SMOLDERING ISSUE IN CIPOLLONE v. LIGGETT
GROUP, INC.: PROCESS CONCERNS IN
DETERMINING WHETHER CIGARETTES ARE A
DEFECTIVELY DESIGNED PRODUCT
Cigarette smoking is the most significant, preventable, environ-
mental factor contributing to illness, disability, and death in the
United States.' Smokers' suits against tobacco manufacturers for
losses allegedly caused by smoking tobacco products, however, have
been largely unsuccessful.2 In the recent case of Cipollone v. Liggett
Group, Inc. ,3 the plaintiff sought damages from the companies4 that
manufactured and sold the cigarettes that allegedly caused the
plaintiff's wife to develop cancer and die. Cipollone's claims
spawned numerous court opinions5 and drew media attention, 6
1 See PUBLIC HEALTH SERVS., U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUC. AND WELFARE, SMOKING
AND HEALTH: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL vii (1979). Cigarette smoking is the
most important known risk factor for lung cancer. Id. at 5-31. It is also the most preva-
lent cause of coronary heart disease in the United States. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVS., U.S.
DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES OF SMOKING-CAR-
DIOVASCULAR DISEASE: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL iv (1983). Heart disease
attributed to smoking caused the premature death of over three million people between
1965 and 1980. Id. at 128.
2 See, e.g., Hudson v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 427 F.2d 541 (5th Cir. 1970) (per
curiam) (granting summary judgment to manufacturer; plaintiff's claim failed under
Louisiana implied warranty law for absence of scientific foreseeability, peculiar defects
in cigarettes, and cancer consequences to substantial segment of the public); Green v.
American Tobacco Co., 409 F.2d 1166 (5th Cir. 1969) (per curiam) (en banc) (reversing
decision that manufacturer could be held absolutely liable for consumer's death caused
by cancer from smoking cigarettes), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 911 (1970); Ross v. Philip Mor-
ris & Co., 328 F.2d 3 (8th Cir. 1964) (refusing to find absolute liability in manufacturer,
because during time of plaintiff's habit, from early 1930s to 1952, manufacturer could
not reasonably have anticipated harm); Lartique v. R.J. Reynolds Co., 317 F.2d 19 (5th
Cir.) (refusing to find strict liability on manufacturer's warranty of wholesomeness with-
out foreseeability of harm), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 865 (1963); Albright v. R.J. Reynolds
Tobacco Co., 350 F. Supp. 341 (W.D. Pa. 1972), aff'd, 485 F.2d 678 (3d Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 416 U.S. 951 (1974).
3 644 F. Supp. 283 (D.N.J. 1986). In theJune 13, 1988 verdict on the merits, the
jury awarded Antonio Cipollone $400,000 based on breach of express warranties by
Liggett Group, Inc. 16 Prod. Safety & Liab. Rep. (BNA) 25 (June 17, 1988). This was
the first time in history that a smoker had recovered damages in court. Id. The jury
found Liggett liable for failure to warn and breach of express warranty. Id. Earlier in
the litigation, the court dismissed the plaintiff's design defect claims that are the subject
of this Note. See infra notes 11 and 100.
4 The defendants in the action were Liggett Group Inc., Philip Morris, Inc., and
Loews, Inc. Id. at 284.
5 See, e.g., Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 106 F.R.D. 573 (D.NJ. 1985), rev'd,
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most of which focused on the validity of Cipollone's state common
law claims in light of the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act.7 For the purpose of this Note, however, Cipollone is significant
because of the process concerns raised" in determining whether cig-
arettes are a defectively designed product.
In Cipollone, the plaintiff argued that cigarettes are so dangerous
and of such little utility that under the risk-utility analysis prescribed
by New Jersey law the court should find cigarettes defective and im-
pose liability on the manufacturer.9 Generally, a court engaging in
risk-utility analysis determines whether a product is defective by
comparing the utility of the product with the risk of injury it poses to
the public.10 In Cipollone, however, the implementation of risk-utility
analysis posed particular difficulty. Unlike most cases of design de-
fect, the Cipollone plaintiff claimed that the defendants were liable
even without proof of a technologically feasible, alternative design
with which the court could compare the cigarette design at issue."I
785 F.2d 1108 (1986) (addressing whether discovering party in civil litigation could pub-
licly disclose discovered materials deemed confidential by producing party); Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 593 F. Supp. 1146 (D.NJ. 1984), rev'd in part, 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir.
1986) (holding that Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-
1340 (1982), only preempted state law damage actions challenging either adequacy of
warning on cigarette packages or a party's actions in advertising and promoting ciga-
rettes), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987); Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 649 F. Supp.
664 (D.NJ. 1986) (clarifying effect of Third Circuit's preemption decision on Cipol-
lone's claim).
6 See, e.g., Mauro, High Court Reects Cigarette Suit: Anti Smoking Forces Say Ruling Just
Minor Setback, USA Today, Jan. 13, 1987, at 3A, col. 5 (discussing Supreme Court's de-
nial of certiorari from Third Circuit's holding on preemption issue).
7 The courts addressed whether the Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising
Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982), preempts Cipollone's state common law claims that
the defendants provided inadequate warnings of the dangers of cigarettes. The Third
Circuit held that the Act preempts those state law claims that challenge either the warn-
ings on cigarette packages or promotion of cigarettes and the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107
S. Ct. 907 (1987).
8 "Process concerns" refers to an awareness of the capabilities and potential diffi-
culties arising from each of the decisionmaking processes, including those of courts,
legislatures, administrative agencies, and private agreement. It also includes concern
for how these various processes of decision interrelate. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW iii (tentative ed.,
1958).
9 Cipollone, 644 F. Supp. at 286.
10 Id. 644 F. Supp. at 287 (citing O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 181, 463
A.2d 298, 304 (1983)); see also Keeton, Product Liability and the Meaning of Defect, 5 ST.
MARY'S LJ. 30, 38 (1973) (product unreasonably dangerous if "a reasonable person
would conclude that the magnitude of the scientifically perceivable danger as it is proved
to be at the time of trial outweighed the benefits of the way the product was so designed and
marketed"); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. LJ. 825, 835
(1973).
11 Traditionally, plaintiffs needed to present evidence of a viable design alternative
in design defect cases. See infra text accompanying note 13. In the trial on the merits
that began Feb. 1, 1988, the plaintiff introduced claims of an allegedly safer alternative
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The plaintiff implicitly asked the court to weigh the benefits and
risks of cigarettes against the alternative of a world without the
product. Such a comparison presents difficulties for courts that
must weigh interrelated social value choices and gather the informa-
tion necessary to reach a correct decision.
Section I of this Note argues that the Cipollone court correctly
excluded the tobacco companies' evidence of the production bene-
fits of taxes, jobs, and profits from the risk-utility analysis. Section
II contends that courts face significant process concerns in design
defect cases when the proposed alternative is a world without the
product. The final section asserts that because of these process con-
cerns and the legislature's superior ability to address the cigarette
controversy, courts adjudicating cases of the type represented by Ci-
pollone should admit evidence of the production effects solely to de-




Courts agree that to recover for injuries from product use, a
plaintiff must show a defect in the product.' 2 Traditionally, New
Jersey courts required a plaintiff to present evidence of a viable al-
ternative product design before it would submit a design defect case
to ajury. t 3 The NewJersey Supreme Court extended the scope of
traditional products liability law in O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 14 holding
that in the absence of an alternative design, a jury may find a prod-
cigarette design. The Washington Post, February 1, 1988, at E2, col. 1; Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864 (D.NJ. April 21, 1988) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist
file). The proposed alternative design contains a mix of heavy metal palladium and mag-
nesium nitrate. The Washington Post, Feb. 6, 1988, at D2, col. 1. The plaintiff alleged
that if Liggett had begun to sell the alternative cigarette in 1971, and Cipollone had
promptly switched to it, she might have reduced her risk of lung cancer. Cipollone, No.
83-2864 (D.NJ. April 21, 1988). The court granted the defendants' motion for a di-
rected verdict on the alternative design claim, ruling that the plaintiff failed to present
evidence from which the jury could reasonably conclude that defendants' failure to mar-
ket a palladium cigarette proximately caused Cipollone's death.
12 E.g., Orfield v. International Harvester Co., 535 F.2d 959, 961 (6th Cir. 1976)
(applying Tennessee law); Barich v. Ottenstror, 170 Mont. 38, 550 P.2d 395 (1976);
Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974); Suvada v. White Motor
Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 210 N.E.2d 182 (1965); Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 NJ.
52, 207 A.2d 305 (1965); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment g (1977);
Annotation, Products Liability: Proof of Defect under Doctrine of Strict Liability in Tort, 51
A.L.R.2d 8 (1973).
13 E.g., Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 NJ. 150, 191, 406 A.2d 140,
150 (1979) ("Did the manufacturer act as a reasonably prudent person by designing the
item as he did and by placing it on the market in that condition, or should he have
designed it to incorporate certain safety features or some other modifications?").
14 94 NJ. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
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uct defective if that product's usefulness outweighs its dangers.
Courts have struggled to discern how to apply the risk-utility analy-
sis to design defect cases and what evidence to admit into this
weighing process. 15
A. Finding a Design Defect Under New Jersey Law
Under New Jersey products liability law, the plaintiff has the
burden of proving a product defective as part of the prima facie case
for the imposition of liability against the manufacturer. 16 The ele-
ments of a prima facie case for design defect are evidence that (1)
the product design was defective, (2) the defect existed when the
defendant distributed the product, and (3) the defect caused injury
to a reasonably foreseeable user. 17
Implicitly, in order to label a product "defective," courts must
compare the product with a standard of evaluation.' 8 The product
in design defect cases must conform to the intended design and
meet the design standard set by the manufacturer. 19 When a prod-
uct is in the condition that the manufacturer intended, a court will
label the product "defective" if it concludes that the manufacturer
should bear liability for harm that the product causes. In reaching
that conclusion, and thus establishing product safety standards, a
court must balance competing value choices implicit in the design.20
To determine whether a product has a design defect, New
15 See, e.g., Dawson v. Chrysler Corp., 630 F.2d 950, 963 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied,
450 U.S. 959 (1981) (court questioned whether jury balancing of risk-utility factors is
"fair or efficient"); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 849 (Tex. 1979)
("The difficulty of formulating a series of specific factors which the fact finders will be
instructed to balance is obvious.").
16 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 179, 463 A.2d 298, 303 (1983).
17 Id. at 179-80, 463 A.2d at 304.
18 Id. at 180, 463 A.2d at 304; Henderson,Judicial Review of Manufacturers' Conscious
Design Choices: The Limits of Adjudication, 73 COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1547 (1973).
19 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 181, 463 A.2d at 304; Henderson, supra note 18, at 1547.
Product defects may be either defects of design or manufacture. O'Brien, 94 NJ. at 181,
463 A.2d at 304; see also Henderson, supra note 18, at 1542-52. In manufacturing defect
cases the products are unreasonably dangerous because of flaws that result from the
production process. A court can evaluate the product by comparing it to the manufac-
turer's intended design. O'Brien, 94 NJ. at 181, 463 A.2d at 304. In such cases a court
need not create its own standard to determine if the product is flawed. Henderson, supra
note 18, at 1544. Some courts and commentators have also classified inadequacy of
proper warning as a product defect. See, e.g., O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 181, 463 A.2d at 304;
Wade, supra note 10, at 842. But cf Wade, On the Effect in Product Liability of Knowledge
Unavailable Prior to Marketing, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 734, 740 (1983) (characterizing failure to
warn as third distinct category of design defect). The Federal Cigarette Labeling and
Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982), preempts state damage actions chal-
lenging the adequacy of warnings of cigarette packages, thus removing the failure to
warn issue from this discussion. See Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181, 187,
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 907 (1987).
20 O'Brien, 94 NJ. at 181, 463 A.2d at 304; Henderson, Renewed Judicial Controversy
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Jersey courts use either the consumer expectations test or risk-utility
analysis. 21 Courts applying the consumer expectations test will find
a product design defective if it fails to meet the reasonable expecta-
tions of the consumer. 22 In the alternative, a court applying risk-
utility analysis engages in a far-reaching balancing test, considering
such factors as the desirability of the product, the safety of the prod-
uct, and the availability of substitutes in determining whether a
product's utility outweighs its risks.23 If a court finds that reason-
able people could not differ on whether the risks posed by a product
outweigh its utility, the court will decide the case as a matter of law
rather than send it to the jury.24 Otherwise, most courts give the
jury a general instruction to determine whether the product is un-
reasonably dangerous rather than instruct a jury to balance risk
against utility. 25
Over Defective Product Design: Toward the Preservation of an Emerging Consensus, 63 MINN. L.
REv. 773, 774 (1979) (court must develop objective standard of product adequacy).
21 Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 NJ. 150, 170-71, 406 A.2d 140,
150-51 (1979). Most courts have used risk-utility analysis as an exclusive or as an alter-
native ground for finding a product defective. For cases adopting risk-utility analysis as
the exclusive ground for liability, see Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d
1066, 1071-73 (4th Cir. 1974); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 67-68, 577
P.2d 1322, 1326 (1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 850 (Tex.
1979). For cases adopting risk-utility analysis and consumers expectations test as alter-
native grounds for liability, see Caterpillar Tractor Co. v. Beck, 593 P.2d 871, 885
(Alaska 1979); Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 455-56, 143
Cal. Rptr. 225, 237-38 (1978); Suter, 81 NJ. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150.
22 Cipollone, 644 F. Supp. at 287 (quoting O'Brien, 94 NJ. at 182, 463 A.2d at 298).
See also Suter, 81 NJ. at 170-71, 406 A.2d at 150.
23 New Jersey courts recognize seven factors as relevant to the determination of
whether a product's utility outweighs its risk:
(1) The usefulness and desirability of the product-its utility to the user
and to the public as a whole.
(2) The safety aspects of the product-the likelihood that it will cause
injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury.
(3) The availability of a substitute product which would meet the same
need and not be as unsafe.
(4) The manufacturer's ability to eliminate the unsafe character of the
product without impairing its usefulness or making it too expensive to
maintain its utility.
(5) The user's ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use
of the product.
(6) The user's anticipated awareness of the dangers inherent in the
product and their avoidability, because of general public knowledge of
the obvious condition of the product, or of the existence of suitable warn-
ings or instructions.
(7) The feasibility, on the part of the manufacturer, of spreading the
loss by setting the price of the product or carrying liability insurance.
Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 NJ. 152, 174, 386 A.2d 816, 826-27 (1978) (quot-
ing Wade, supra note 10, at 837-38).
24 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 185, 463 A.2d at 306. A case in which plaintiff sued a butcher
knife manufacturer solely because the "knife was so sharp that it was likely to cut human
flesh" would not get to the jury. Wade, supra note 10, at 838.
25 NewJersey courts have instructed the jury in terms of reasonable fitness, suitabil-
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B. O'Brien v. Muskin Corp. Extends the Scope of Risk-Utility
Analysis to Products With No Feasible Alternative
A majority ofjurisdictions require a plaintiff alleging a defective
product to present evidence of a viable, safer alternative design as
part of the plaintiff's prima facie case. 26 In O'Brien v. Muskin Corp.27
the New Jersey Supreme Court broke with this majority, holding
that a plaintiff could recover under risk-utility analysis for a design
defect without producing evidence of a feasible alternative design.28
The plaintiff in O'Brien sued the manufacturer and the distribu-
tor of an above-ground swimming pool to recover damages for per-
sonal injuries. When the plaintiff dove into the pool, his
outstretched hands slid on the vinyl pool lining and his head struck
the pool bottom. The plaintiff alleged that the pool was defectively
designed because the manufacturer should have made the liner less
slippery. The trial court removed the defective design issue from
the jury because the plaintiff failed to show the feasibility of an alter-
native design.29
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the trial court's deci-
sion, holding that the jury might have found the manufacturer liable
because the risk posed by the pool outweighed its utility.3 0 The
O'Brien court acknowledged that there are products without techno-
logically feasible alternatives that "are so dangerous and of such lit-
tle use that under the risk-utility analysis, a manufacturer would
bear the cost of liability of harm to others."31 The court further
reasoned that the imposition of liability "might dissuade a manufac-
turer from placing the product on the market, even if the product
has been made as safely as possible."3 2
C. Previous Attempts to Measure Utility in
Design Defect Cases
In prior applications of the risk-utility standard, courts have fo-
cused on the product's utility to the consumer in determining the
utility of the product. They have not, however, considered in their
ity, and safety. See, e.g., Suter, 81 N.J. at 174, 406 A.2d at 152; cf Voss v. Black & Decker
Mfg. Co., 59 N.Y.2d 102, 450 N.E.2d 204, 463 N.Y.S.2d 398 (1983) (judge should in-
struct jury to decide whether defect exists on basis of all pertinent evidence).
26 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
27 94 N.J. 169, 463 A.2d 298 (1983).
28 Under prior New Jersey law, a plaintiff in a design defect case had to show there
was an "alternative, safer design, practicable under the circumstances." Huddell v.
Levin, 537 F.2d 726, 737 (3d Cir. 1976).
29 O'Brien, 94 N.J. at 175-79; 463 A.2d at 301-03.
30 Id. at 185; 463 A.2d at 306.




calculus the collateral economic benefits from the manufacture and
sale of the product.33 For example, in Moore v. R. G. Industries34 the
Ninth Circuit weighed the utility of small, relatively inexpensive
handguns known as "Saturday Night Specials" against their risk of
causing injury. In analyzing the utility of the handguns the court
considered only the utility of such handguns to the consumer for
recreational use or protection, 35 and not production benefits result-
ing from handgun manufacture or sale.36
Similarly, in O'Brien the court discussed the utility of the prod-
uct in terms of the consumer need it fulfilled; the court did not con-
sider production benefits in its opinion.37 Indeed, prior to Cipollone,
no New Jersey court and no court in any other jurisdiction had dis-
cussed whether collateral economic benefits are relevant to risk-util-
ity analysis.
II
Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.
In Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc.38 plaintiff Antonio Cipollone
sought damages in a products liability action against tobacco com-
panies that manufactured and sold cigarettes. He alleged that the
defendants' cigarettes caused his wife's fatal lung cancer. 39 In his
33 See, e.g., Dreisonstok v. Volkswagenwerk, A.G., 489 F.2d 1066 (4th Cir. 1974);
Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 282 Or. 61, 577 P.2d 1322 (1978) (economic contribu-
tions of auto and aviation industries not considered by courts applying risk-utility analy-
sis to these types of products). Compare this approach, however, with that of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts section 520 which indicates that when the prosperity of
the community depends upon the dangerous activity, the benefits of the activity may
outweigh the risk of serious injury and strict liability is not imposed. RESTATEMENT (SEC-
OND) OF TORTS § 520 comment k (1977).
34 789 F.2d 1326 (9th Cir. 1986).
35 Id. at 1327. Courts traditionally include in the utility of handguns their use by
consumers in target shooting, hunting, collecting, self-defense, and providing owners
with psychic security.
36 Id. Commentators have distinguished handguns, like matches and knives, as ge-
nerically dangerous products: if a handgun does not have the capacity to kill, a match to
ignite, or a knife to cut, then it is not properly designated a handgun, match, or knife.
E.g., Note, Handguns and Products Liability, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1912, 1916 (1984). Some
courts, in applying risk utility analysis, have refused to find such products defective for
the inherent dangerousness of their function. Id.; see, e.g., Dorsey v. Yoder Co., 331 F.
Supp. 753, 759 (E.D. Pa. 1971), aff'd mem., 474 F.2d 1339 (3d Cir. 1973). In contrast,
"[t]he cancer-producing qualities of cigarettes are generic only in the sense that all ciga-
rettes have those qualities but they are neither produced nor consumed for that reason."
Traynor, The Ways and Meanings of Defective Products and Strict Liability, 32 TENN. L. REV.
363, 370 (1965).
37 O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 184, 463 A.2d 298, 306 (1983). See also
Metal Window Prods. Co. v. Magnusen, 485 S.W.2d 355 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972) (court
failed to consider collateral economic benefits in weighing risks of transparent glass
against its utility).
38 644 F. Supp. 283 (D.NJ. 1986).
39 Id. at 284. Rose Cipollone smoked for approximately forty years. She smoked
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complaint, the plaintiff argued that the court should apply risk-util-
ity analysis and that the health risks of cigarettes outweighed their
social utility. In response to the plaintiff's interrogatories, the de-
fendants gave this description of the social utility of cigarettes:
The chief component of the social utility of cigarettes is the enjoy-
ment that they provide the millions of individuals in this country
who have chosen to smoke....
[In addition, t]he cigarette industry is a major contributor to the
nation's economy. The industry provides thousands of jobs in
manufacturing and... sales. Moreover, thousands of farm fami-
lies derive their livelihood from their tobacco crop. Cigarettes are
an important export and as such have a favorable impact upon the
nation's balance of trade. And, of course, the industry contributes
substantially to the public fisc by way of its payment of federal,
state and local taxes.40
The plaintiff brought a motion in limine to exclude evidence of
the social benefits of cigarette production from the risk-utility analy-
sis.41 The defendants opposed the motion on the grounds that evi-
dence of every kind of social benefit stemming from the product is
admissible for use in risk-utility analysis.42 The court granted the
plaintiffs' motion in limine, holding that the manufacturer's reason-
ableness in placing the product on the market depends only upon
the social benefits of cigarettes to the cigarette smoker, and not
upon the collateral social benefits of cigarette production.43
The Cipollone court, applying New Jersey law, refused to extend
the scope of risk-utility analysis beyond the usefulness and dangers
Chesterfield, L & M, Virginia Slims, Parliament, and True brands. Margolick, Antismok-
ing Climate Inspires Suits by the Dying, N.Y. Times, Mar. 15, 1985, at B1, col. 3. Before her
death Cipollone commented, "I thought that it was cool to smoke, and grown up, and I
was going to be glamourous or beautiful.... I thought I would be Joan Crawford or
Bette Davis." Id.
40 Cipollone, 644 F. Supp. at 285.
41 Id. at 285-86.
42 Id at 286.
43 Id at 290. The court decided two subsidiary issues in the Cipollone case. The
court rejected the defendants' argument that the motion in limine was premature. The
court also briefly addressed the defendants' contention that the plaintiff's state common
law claim would potentially price cigarettes out of the market, and thus would contradict
Congressional intent expressed in the Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act. Id. at
289. See Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1340 (1982). The
court, referring to the Third Circuit cigarette labeling preemption decision, Cipollone v.
Liggett Group, Inc., 789 F.2d 181 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 917 (1987), held
that the Act did not preempt the plaintiff's state common law claims. Cipollone, 644 F.
Supp. at 289. The Cipollone court noted that from a practical perspective, although it was
entirely possible that a finding of manufacturer liability would result in a price increase
in cigarettes to reflect the costs of compensating those harmed, it was unclear that ciga-
rette sales would end. Id.
19881 613
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
inherent in the product itself.44 The court drew support for this
conclusion from New Jersey precedent, finding that despite the
breadth of New Jersey risk-utility analysis, 45 courts had not included
production benefits in such analyses.46
The court further reasoned that the introduction of evidence of
production benefits would run counter to the goals of "strict liabil-
ity" 47 theory. First, the court explained, strict liability law aims to
temper the profit motive by making a manufacturer aware that mar-
keting a safer product or not marketing a product at all could cost
less in the long run than marketing a product under its present de-
44 Cipollone, 644 F. Supp. at 288.
45 See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
46 Cipollone, 644 F. Supp. at 288 ("the New Jersey Supreme Court's decisions have
never said that a product's utility may be established by looking to whether the defend-
ant 'reasonably' believed that its profits would be sufficient to maintain a livelihood, hire
employees, or pay taxes by operating the company that placed a product on the
market").
47 NewJersey and many other jurisdictions use "strict liability" language when dis-
cussing design defects. See O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 94 N.J. 169, 179, 463 A.2d 298,
303 (1983); Suter v. San Angelo Foundry & Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 168-69, 406 A.2d
140, 149 (1979); Cepeda v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 76 N.J. 152, 386 A.2d 816 (1978);
Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 432, 573 P.2d 443, 453, 143 Cal. Rptr. 225,
235 (1978); Turner v. General Motors Corp., 584 S.W.2d 844, 848 (Tex. 1979). How-
ever, an emerging consensus describes risk-utility analysis as fundamentally a fault-
based negligence test. See, e.g., Birnbaum, Unmasking the Test for Design Defect: From Negli-
gence [to Warranty] to Strict Liability to Negligence, 33 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1980) (risk-utility
analysis is a negligence test); Henderson, supra note 20, at 777-79; Heonig, Product De-
signs and Strict Tort Liability: Is There a Better Approach?, 8 Sw. U. L. REV. 109 (1976); see also
Wade, supra note 19, at 748-49 (risk-utility analysis essentially a negligence test but be-
cause courts will reach same result under either theory, there is little need to change
from strict liability approach). The decision of the drafters of the Model Uniform Prod-
uct Liability Act to reject the language of strict liability and place design cases on a fault
basis reflects this trend. MODEL UNIFORM PRODUCT LIABILITY ACT § 104 comments, 44
Fed. Reg. 62,722 (1979). A court using a negligence approach focuses upon the reason-
ableness of the manufacturer's conduct in choosing between alternative designs. Hen-
derson, supra note 20, at 777. The strict liability approach focuses solely upon the
reasonableness of the design. Id. Risk-utility analysis, however, combines the ap-
proaches: the manufacturer's design reflects the reasonableness of the manufacturer's
decision in choosing the design. Id; Wade, supra note 19, at 748. The ultimate question
in both a negligence case and in a risk-utility case is whether a reasonable person, recog-
nizing the risk she was creating, would have acted differently. See J. HENDERSON & A.
TWERSKI, PRODUCTS LIABILITr: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 512-13 (1987). Judge Learned
Hand's formulation of the negligence test is actually the same as risk-utility analysis. Id.
The great similarity of the risk-utility and negligence standards leads to the conclusion
that "[in] the context of determining whether the defendant should have adopted a pro-
posed alternative design, the words 'strict liability' have almost no meaning." Id at 509.
It is important to note that strict liability and negligence grounds for imposing liability
might produce different outcomes if the defendant could prove that he could not have
known of the risk of the design choice at the time the choice was made. The defendant
would be liable under strict liability, but not under negligence theory. Henderson, supra
note 20, at 777. Despite this difference, negligence and strict liability analyses will reach
the same result in practically all improper design cases. Wade, supra note 19, at 748.
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sign.48 Second, strict liability requires that a product "pay its way"
by compensating for the harm it causes.49 If courts impose liability
upon the manufacturer, the product's true costs to society are re-
flected in its price; failure to impose liability, however, leads manu-
facturers to sell a product when its true costs to society outweigh its
social benefits.50 Thus the court found irrelevant to its analysis the
defendants' attempt to establish that selling cigarettes is profitable,
that these profits are distributed to others in society, and that im-
posing liability would reduce or eliminate these profits. 51 The court
concluded that to permit a manufacturer to introduce evidence of a
product's profitability would undermine the goals of greater overall
economic efficiency and product safety. 52
III
ANALYSIS
An initial examination of the traditional application of risk-util-
ity analysis and the O'Brien extension of this analysis suggests that a
plaintiff can prove a design defect in two ways: (1) prove that'the
manufacturer was unreasonable because it marketed the product as
designed instead of using a technologically feasible alternative de-
sign;53 or (2) when no technologically feasible alternative is avail-
able, prove that the manufacturer was unreasonable in selling the
product at all.54 This second application essentially requires a court
to compare the world with the product to a world without it. Analy-
sis of the Cipollone decision reveals that these two alternatives both
compare a defendant's alternative courses of conduct, but that a
court applying the second alternative will face more difficulties.
Section III(A) of the following analysis argues that the Cipollone
court correctly refused to allow evidence of taxes paid, jobs created,
and profits made by the tobacco manufacturers into the risk-utility
analysis because these represent societal benefits already measured
by consumer benefits. Section III(B) contends that comparing a
product with the product's absence strains judicial decision making
to its limits. The final subsection concludes that ajudge should ad-
mit evidence of the economic impact of cigarette production, not for
use in risk-utility analysis, but to determine whether serious process
concerns prevent the judge or jury from legitimately undertaking
the risk-utility analysis. When plaintiffs are unable to present a tech-
48 Cipollone, 644 F. Supp. at 288.
49 Id. at 289.
50 Id.
51 Id. at 288.
52 Id at 289.
53 See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
54 See supra notes 28-32 and accompanying text.
1988] 615
CORNELL LA W REVIEW
nologically feasible alternative design, the court should perform a
screening function before it sends the case to the jury. If the court
finds that process difficulties preclude a legitimate risk-utility analy-
sis, the court should either dismiss the case on the pleadings or di-
rect the verdict, thus preventing the case from reaching the risk-
utility, reasonableness test.
A. The Cipollone Court Correctly Excluded Evidence of
Cigarette Production Effects From Risk-Utility Analysis
In defense of their products, the cigarette manufacturers in Ci-
pollone attempted to introduce evidence of the utility of cigarettes:
the consumer enjoyment of cigarettes as well as the production ben-
efits of the product, including taxes paid by the industry, employees
hired by the industry, profits made by the manufacturer, and the
favorable impact of distributed cigarette profits. 55 The Cipollone
court allowed the defendant manufacturers to submit evidence of
the consumer enjoyment of smoking, but prohibited evidence of the
economic effects of cigarette production. 56 In disallowing the de-
fendants' introduction of the production effects of cigarettes, the
court explained that risk-utility analysis "was never meant to bal-
ance the risk to the consumer against the general benefit to soci-
ety .... It is the benefit and utility to the cigarette smoker which is
here in issue, and not the benefit to the cigarette industry or those
in turn, who benefit from its existence." '57
The Cipollone court correctly determined that consumer enjoy-
ment of smoking is a benefit of cigarettes relevant to the utility side
of the risk-utility analysis. Although the court indicated that it
would allow the parties to introduce evidence of the benefits of ciga-
rettes, it did not discuss how the parties should measure such bene-
fits. Generally, economists measure the value or benefit of
consumption of a good by the amount an individual is willing to pay
for it.58 In the market, the price of a good represents its minimum
value to any person who actually purchases it. Thus, the difference
55 A 1985 study found that the tobacco industry employed approximately 0.46%o of
the U.S. labor force, generated total expenditures of $31.5 billion directly and through
upstream and downstream economic linkages (roughly 1%o of the U.S. GNP), and paid
$13.46 billion in federal, state, and local taxes. Gray & Walter, The Economic Contribution
of the Tobacco Industry, in SMOKING AND SocIry 243, 252-53 (R. Tollison ed. 1986).
56 The plaintiff did not challenge the defendants' introduction of proof that "[t]he
chief component of the social utility of cigarettes is the enjoyment they provide millions
of individuals in this country who have chosen to smoke." Cipollone, 644 F. Supp. at 285.
57 Id. at 290.
58 See R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW § 1.2, at 11 (3d ed. 1986) [hereinafter
R. POSNER, ANALYSIS]; see also R. POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE 60 (1981) ("Since
Adam Smith, the term 'value' in economics has generally referred to value in exchange,
value as measured or at least measurable in a market, whether explicit or implicit. From
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between what a person would willingly pay for the good and what he
or she actually pays for it in the market represents the consumer's
net benefit derived from the good. 59
The Cippolone court correctly excluded economic production ef-
fects from the utility side of the risk-utility analysis. Even if the
court had chosen to look at all societal costs and benefits of ciga-
rettes, most production effects should be excluded.60 Under a risk-
utility analysis based upon consumer benefits, the court properly
would ignore the societal effects of taxes, jobs, and profits. 61 First,
the tobacco companies had urged the court, in effect, to "double-
count" the benefits of cigarettes by including both the profits from
the manufacture and sale of cigarettes and the dissemination of a
portion of those profits to others in society as benefits of cigarette
production.62 "Double-counting" is the error of counting real ben-
efits more than once.63 The payment of a portion of tobacco com-
pany profits to intermediate sellers and farmers would not in and of
itself create any additional benefits but instead constitutes only a
transfer of an existing benefit. Thus, asking the court to consider as
the concept of value derives the concept of the wealth of society as the sum of all goods
and services in the society weighted by their values.").
Some smokers take intense pleasure from smoking cigarettes. Mark Twain wrote,
"Why, my old boy, when they used to tell me I would shorten my life term years by
smoking, they little knew the devotee they were wasting their puerile word upon-they
little knew how trivial and valueless I would regard a decade that had no smoking in it!"
Twain, Letter to Rev. Twitchell, in THE PLEASURES OF SMOKING 167, 167-68 (S. Watkins
comp. 1948). The price of cigarettes, however, may be an overly generous measure of
cigarette's benefits. There is evidence that consumers are buying more cigarettes than
they would if the risks were fully known and responded to rationally. One argument is
that smokers do not have sufficient knowledge of the specific health risks of smoking,
that smokers lack information or warning as to the magnitude of smoking's risks, that
almost half of all smokers may be unaware that smoking is addictive, and that manufac-
turers' promotional activities directed at consumers undermine the effectiveness of
health warnings. Note, Plaintiff's Conduct as a Defense to Claims Against Cigarette Manufactur-
ers, 99 HARV. L. REV. 809, 813-17 (1986). Cigarettes are a peculiar product in that 87%0
of cigarette consumers want to quit smoking. Friedrich, Where There's Smoke, TIME, Feb.
23, 1987, at 22, 23 (citing statistic reported by Dr. C. Everett Koop, U.S. Surgeon
General).
59 This net benefit is called consumer surplus. J. HIRSCHLEIFER, PRICE THEORY AND
APPLICATIONS 204-06 (4th ed. 1988). This estimate of net benefits may overstate the
benefits of cigarettes if consumers do not properly evaluate the risks of smoking. See
supra note 58.
60 Arguably, had the court decided to include all societal benefits of production it
might properly have considered producer surplus as a net benefit to society. Producer
surplus represents the difference between the payments producers actually receive in
the market and the amount they would willingly accept to supply their products in the
market. For a further discussion of producer surplus, see J. HIRSCHLEIFER, supra note
58, at 204-06.
61 This Note assumes that tobacco producers earn a normal rate of return on their
invested assets and thus earn zero economic profits.
62 Cipollone, 644 F. Supp. at 289-90.
63 E. MISHAN, COST-BENEFrr ANALYSIS 78 (2d ed. 1976).
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a benefit both the profits of the tobacco companies and the distribu-
tion of those profits to others would constitute double counting. 64
This double-counting of benefits would overestimate the value of
cigarettes to society and thereby wreak havoc on attempts to weigh
the risk against the utility of the product.
Second, economists treat the labor used to produce a good as
an "opportunity cost" rather than as a benefit of that good.65 An
opportunity cost is what one gives up in order to have something
else, regardless of whether this lost opportunity results from an out-
lay or a forbearance. 66 The opportunity cost of a tobacco worker's
services equals that worker's best alternative employment.67 Rather
than being an economic benefit of cigarette production, labor em-
ployed by the tobacco industry represents a societal cost because
those workers forbear other types of employment.68
Third, the taxes paid by the tobacco industry are transfer pay-
ments; they diminish the tobacco companies' purchasing power and
increase the recipients' collective purchasing power by the same
amount.69 Transfer of money by taxation is neither a social cost nor
a social benefit because gains to one sector are offset by costs in
another.70
The defendant's position favoring inclusion of economic pro-
duction effects in the utility side of the risk-utility analysis incor-
rectly assumes that the taxes, jobs, and profits resulting from
cigarette production reflect societal benefits in addition to the bene-
64 See id. at 80.
65 See Harberger, On Measuring the Social Opportunity Cost of Labour, 103 INT'L LABOUR
REV. 559, 559 (1971) (examining "the commonly held notion that the opportunity cost
of labour is represented by the products that is forgone from other activities as a conse-
quence of its being labour for a given activity").
66 C. GOETZ, CASES AND MATERIALS ON LAW AND ECONOMICS 52 (1984) (relevant lost
opportunity is highest-valued alternative that is given up).
67 R. POSNER, ANALYSIS, supra note 58, § 1.1, at 6.
68 Even if the tobacco farmers or other employees of the tobacco industry would be
involuntarily unemployed absent the jobs created by the tobacco industry, these jobs are
still not a societal benefit of cigarettes. In an economic analysis such as risk-utility, to-
bacco industry jobs that employ workers who would otherwise be unemployed are
neither a societal cost nor a societal benefit of cigarettes. In this case the market price of
these workers exceeds their opportunity cost because the opportunity cost equals a
lower sum just large enough to compensate these workers for their nonmarket activities
or "idleness." Whether these workers would otherwise be unemployed is relevant to
how large the opportunity cost of their labor truly is, but does not make the opportunity
cost become a benefit. Thus, a court should not enter the market price of labor into
either the benefit or the cost side of the risk-utility calculation. See E. MISHAN, supra note
63, at 68-69.
69 A transfer payment is a transfer of benefits from one sector of the economy to
another without any increase in aggregate welfare; the benefits to one sector offset costs
to another. T. KLEIN, SOCIAL COSTS AND BENEFITS oF BUSINESS 113 (1977).
70 See R. POSNER, ANALYSIS, supra note 58, § 1. 1, at 7; E. MISHAN, supra note 63, at
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fits of consumer enjoyment. Instead, these economic production ef-
fects are either not true societal benefits, or have already been
counted through the court's use of consumer benefits. The Cipollone
court thus correctly excluded evidence of the taxes,jobs, and profits
from the risk-utility analysis.
B. Process Concerns Raised By the Alternative of Not Selling
the Product at All
The judicial resolution of design defect cases becomes increas-
ingly difficult as the alternative designs become increasingly dissimi-
lar. In most design cases, courts compare two technologically
feasible alternative designs, engaging in a marginal comparison of
the increases and decreases in utility and risk incurred should the
alternative design replace the original.7 1 Even if the plaintiff alleges
liability in absence of a technologically feasible alternative design, as
in O'Brien or Cipollone, a court still must make a marginal comparison
of alternative courses of conduct by the defendant. For example,
implicit in the plaintiff's allegation of a product defect in O'Brien is a
comparison of two alternatives: the alternative of above-ground
swimming pools as designed by the manufacturer and the alterna-
tive of no above-ground pools at all. 72
Comparisons between two technologically feasible designs and
between the product and "a world without the product" are not dif-
ferent in kind; both are marginal comparisons of a manufacturer's
alternative courses of conduct. The difference is one of degree. A
court comparing an existing product against a world without the
product is comparing alternatives that are more dissimilar than two
71 The plaintiff might, for example, offer proof of the feasibility of manufacturing
cigarettes with a filter on the tip that would reduce the health hazards associated with
smoking below the dangers of the design currently used by the manufacturer. A court
must make a marginal comparison of two technologically feasible alternatives: the alter-
native of the current design of cigarettes without the filter, and the alternative of the
proposed design of cigarettes with the filter. The comparison is marginal because the
court evaluates the comparative rather than the total utility and risk. A court will choose
a safer alternative design if its additional utility outweighs its additional risks even when
the total utility of the original design exceeds the original's total risks. Henderson, supra
note 20, at 775 n.l1.
72 This implicit comparison of alternatives is inevitable:
Concededly, proof of a feasible alternative is not often imposed explicitly
as a formal requirement at common law. As a practical matter, however,
plaintiffs in most design cases find themselves forced by the circum-
stances to attack the defendants' designs by pointing to a safer, less un-
reasonably dangerous alternative. Certainly under a negligence
approach, the feasible alternative requirement is implied in the necessity
for the plaintiff to show that a reasonable person would have acted differ-
ently from (and more safely than) the defendant.
Henderson, Manufacturer's Liability for Defective Product Design: A Proposed Statutory Reform,
56 N.C.L. REv. 625, 636 n.41 (1978).
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technologically feasible designs. As the present design and the pro-
posed alternative become more and more dissimilar, courts face
special problems in weighing interrelated value choices and gather-
ing sufficient data. These process concerns become a threat to prin-
cipled judicial decisionmaking. 73
The judicial response to a design defect case should vary in re-
lation to the nature of the problem. Certain cases "involve the de-
sign of a small, insignificant part whose alteration will affect little
but the part itself. Others involve the court in virtually redesigning
an automobile or an airplane. Litigation of the first type may be
quite judicially manageable; litigation of the second type may com-
promise the judicial process." 74 In cases involving comparisons of
technologically feasible designs, a court can narrow the range of
competing societal values when applying risk-utility analysis and
thus render the litigation judicially manageable. For example, the
plaintiff might offer proof that a certain filter tip would significantly
reduce the health risks of smoking with an acceptable level of in-
creased cost. The defendant might counter with evidence that some
smokers will experience a bitter aftertaste because of the proposed
filter. Although the problem presents a choice among competing
societal values, the litigants and the court can focus on the tradeoff
between only two variables.
Comparisons of technologically feasible designs involving more
radical changes in the original product present a court with many
interrelated competing value choices. In such cases the plaintiff
posits not the alternation of a small, independent component of the
product, but implicitly asks the court to compare the original with a
redesigned, fundamentally changed product. In extreme cases, a
comparison of the present design with a radically altered design de-
nies litigants meaningful participation in the court's decisionmaking
process. A litigant's initial argument in a case depends upon how
the court chooses to evaluate every other aspect of the design rele-
vant to the final product.75 The litigants cannot address the societal
value choices embodied in any one aspect of the design apart from a
consideration of all other aspects of the design to logically reach a
certain result. Thus, comparisons of technologically feasible but
73 For an economic analysis arguing that courts should not adopt the O'Brien exten-
sion of products liability law, see Note, Strict Products Liability and the Risk-Utility Test for
Design Defect: An Economic Analysis, 84 COLUM. L. REv. 2045, 2046 (1984) (authored by
Kim Larsen).
74 Twerski, Seizing the Middle Ground Between Rules and Standards in Design Defect Litiga-
tion: Advancing Directed Verdict Practice in the Law of Torts, 57 N.Y.U. L. REv. 521, 553
(1982). Professor Twerski asserts that courts should vary their responses based on the
"polycentricity quotient" of the facts of each case. Id.
75 Henderson, supra note 18, at 1536.
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highly dissimilar alternatives may present litigants with a hopeless
task and leave judges without guidance to choose among the com-
peting social values. 76
Dawson v. Chrysler Corp.77 epitomizes the dilemma of a court fac-
ing highly dissimilar design choices. The plaintiffs alleged that a pa-
trol car was defective because it lacked a continuous steel frame
through the door panels or a cross-member running through the
floor board between the posts separating the front and back doors
of the car.78 These design alternatives, the plaintiffs argued, would
have lessened the injury that one plaintiff received when the car col-
lided sideways with a steel pole.79 Chrysler, however, maintained
that the patrol car's design was more socially beneficial than the pro-
posed substitute. Under cross-examination, the plaintiffs' experts
admitted the value of the patrol car's actual design: (1) it absorbed
impact in a majority of automobile crashes, and thus was safer than
the proposed alternative; (2) it weighed 200 to 250 pounds less than
the proposed alternative; and (3) it cost the consumer $300 less
than the proposed alternative.80 The Third Circuit concluded that it
was bound by New Jersey law to affirm the jury verdict for the plain-
tiff, but expressed grave doubts as to the legitimacy of a court
choosing among these conflicting product attributes.81
The Cipollone comparison of the defendants' cigarettes and the
alternative of no cigarettes presents a task exponentially more diffi-
cult than redesigning an automobile. The comparison of a product
with the no product alternative involves an overwhelming number
of competing value choices. When the plaintiff posits the removal of
76 Professor Fuller described these nonjusticiable problems as "polycentric."
Fuller, Collective Bargaining, and the Arbitrator, 1963 Wis. L. REv. 1, 33. Fuller's classic
example of polycentricity involves a wealthy lady who dies, leaving a collection of paint-
ings to the National Gallery and the Metropolitan Museum "in equal shares" but with-
out specifying an apportionment. According to Fuller, the polycentricity of dividing the
paintings among the two museums
lies in the fact that the disposition of any single painting has implications
for the proper disposition of every other painting. If it gets the Renoir,
the Gallery may be less eager for the Cezanne, but all the more eager for
the Bellows, et cetera. If the proper apportionment were set for argument,
there would be no clear issue to which either side could direct its proofs
and contentions.
Fuller, Adjudication and the Rule of Law, 1960 PRoc. AM. Soc'Y INT'L L. 1, 3-4.
Other examples of problems presenting varying degrees of polycentricity include:
setting wages and prices in a managed economy, assigning players of a football team to
their positions, redrawing the boundaries of election districts, allocating limited funds to
various scientific research projects, id., and evaluating a doctor's performance in a medi-
cal malpractice case, Henderson, supra note 18, at 1542.
77 630 F.2d 950 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 959 (1981).
78 Id. at 954.
79 Id.
80 Id. at 958-59.
81 Id. at 962-63.
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an entire product line from the market, the court cannot focus on
one small, incremental change at a time. The court can no longer,
for example, hold constant the price and relaxation benefits of ciga-
rettes and focus solely on the tradeoff between a bitter aftertaste
and reduced health risks. The "should not have sold any cigarettes
at all" alternative brings all the defendants' design choices into the
fray at once.
Even absent the difficulty of isolating competing social values
inherent in design choices, the added problem of lack of informa-
tion deters judicial resolution. When a court compares the existing
design with a slightly altered product, it can safely assume that most
prior users will replace the old product with the proposed alterna-
tive. In contrast, a court using risk-utility analysis to compare the
product with no product compares the existing product with a com-
pletely unknown future situation. Prior smokers may "replace" cig-
arettes with chewing tobacco, gum chewing, overeating, or knitting.
Other smokers will seek no replacement for cigarettes at all. The
proposed alternative becomes a moving target, with each individual
defining the alternative of "no cigarettes" differently. If smokers,
suddenly cut off from access to cigarettes, turn to chewing tobacco
or overeating, both activities associated with health risks of their
own, then the alternative of "no cigarettes" would probably not fare
well in the court's risk-utility analysis. If ex-smokers occupy their
hands with knitting, however, the alternative of "no cigarettes"
compares more favorably to the current design of cigarettes. Lack
of data leads the court to different results depending upon the as-
sumptions that the court makes.
C. The Screening Function of the Courts in
Design Defect Litigation
Thus far, this Note has analyzed Cipollone in two distinct strands.
First, it has shown that the evidence of taxes, jobs, and profits of-
fered by the tobacco companies is not a legitimate part of the risk-
utility analysis. Second, it has established that courts face significant
process difficulties in design defect cases when the proposed alter-
native is a world without the product. These two strands interrelate.
Although it is inappropriate for a court to use production-effects
evidence at the risk-utility stage, a court faced with overwhelming
process concerns should use production-effects evidence to perform
a screening function at an earlier stage in the proceedings. Because
of process concerns, a court faced with facts of the type present in
Cipollone should perform a screening function at the pleading or di-
rected verdict stages to determine whether it is capable of deciding
the case on the merits. At this stage, the court should examine the
622 [Vol. 73:606
CIPOLLONE v. LIGGETT GROUP, INC.
process concerns of the case, the results of its decision if it is wrong,
and the ability of the legislature to solve the problem. If, after ex-
amining these factors, the court thinks that the factors counsel
against deciding the case, the court should either dismiss the case or
direct a verdict for the defendant.
A court performing a screening function at either the directed
verdict or pleadings stage focuses largely upon broad policy consid-
erations. Abnormally-dangerous-activity law8 2 provides the prece-
dent for courts to remove cases from jury consideration as a matter
of policy. The decision to classify activities as abnormally danger-
ous, and to hold actors engaging in such activities liable regardless
of fault, centers on highly visible policy determinations rather than
factfinding.8 3 Classifying an activity as abnormally dangerous is
solely a decision for the judge, and these categorizations, once es-
tablished, have precedential value.8 4
The broad impact of judicial design defect decisions has led
many observers to compare such cases to those involving abnor-
mally-dangerous-activity law.85 A court finding a design defect can
affect the safety practices of an entire industry, rendering manufac-
turers vulnerable to future suits86 and sometimes classifying whole
product lines as unsafe. Thus, these cases differ from fact-sensitive
negligence cases.8 7 In both abnormally-dangerous-activity cases
and in design defect cases that lack evidence of a technologically
feasible alternative design, courts should remove these policy deter-
minations from the jury.
82 The Restatement (Second) of Torts section 520 lists the following factors as rele-
vant to whether a class of conduct is abnormally dangerous:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land
or chattels of others;
(b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great;
(c) inability to eliminate the risk by the exercise of reasonable care;
(d) extent to which the activity is not a matter of common usage;
(e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and
(f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dan-
gerous attributes.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977).
83 Twerski, supra note 74, at 543-44.
84 Id. at 543.
85 Justice Schreiber, concurring and dissenting in O'Brien, argued that the court
should have designated which products should be subject to absolute liability. O'Brien
v. Muskin Corp., 94 NJ. 169, 192, 463 A.2d 298, 310 (1983) (Schreiber, J., concurring
and dissenting). To support his view, Schreiber looked to abnormally dangerous activity
law, in which the court designates which categories of activity are abnormally dangerous.
Id. at 196, 463 A.2d at 312.
For further comparisons between design defect and abnormally dangerous activity
law, see Twerski, supra note 74, at 544; Wade, supra note 10, at 835.
86 Twerski, supra note 74, at 544-45.
87 Id at 546.
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In determining whether it is capable of reaching a decision on
the merits, a court should first make an assessment of the
probability of a wrong decision resulting from process concerns. As
the present design and the proposed alternative design become
more and more dissimilar, courts face growing problems in weigh-
ing interrelated value choices and gathering sufficient data. On
facts such as those in Cipollone, these process concerns threaten prin-
cipled judicial decisionmaking and weigh against deciding the case
on the merits.
A second important aspect of the screening stage for design de-
fect cases is the potential effect of a wrong decision by the court.
Courts should ascertain what is at stake if the judge or jury reaches
the wrong result under the risk-utility analysis. To do so, a court
needs evidence of the overall social and economic impact of a wrong
result.88 In Cipollone-type cases, evidence of the number of tobacco
farmers employed by the tobacco industry or the taxes paid by the
tobacco manufacturers, although not an appropriate part of the
jury's risk-utility analysis of cigarettes,89 may become relevant to de-
termine the effect of a wrong judicial decision. If these effects are
substantial, then this factor weighs in favor of a court removing the
case from the jury.
Before deciding whether it can decide the case on the merits, a
court must consider the third factor of whether the legislature is
likely to address the issue and whether the legislature is better
suited than the court to do so. Legislatures theoretically represent
the will of the people in deciding which social objectives are priori-
ties. They mix managerial authority and negotiation among persons
or groups in order to address competing value choices. 90 Unlike the
judiciary, legislatures need not isolate factors relevant to a decision
and address each apart from the rest in order to function properly.9'
In addition, a legislature gathers data much better than a court,
which cannot hold committee hearings or authorize detailed studies.
Legislative bodies are better suited to answer the question of how
much of society's limited resources should be spent on safety, leav-
ing less resources to devote to other competing social objectives.92
Although no legislation presently bans cigarettes, this is not an
88 "A court that perceives it is making an important policy decision by letting a
design defect case go to the jury will transcend the simple counting or balancing of the
elements of a risk-utility analysis in order to consider the overall social and economic
impact of a possible jury finding of defect." Twerski, supra note 74, at 549-50.
89 See supra notes 55-70 and accompanying text.
90 Henderson, supra note 18, at 1555 & n.103.
91 Cf supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text (separation of factors relevant to a
judicial decision).
92 See Henderson, supra note 18, at 1540.
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area that needs judicial intervention as a political catalyst to draw
attention to the cigarette problem.93 The general public and the
nation's legislatures are vigorously debating the cigarette contro-
versy. Forty states presently restrict smoking in public places and
approximately eight hundred local ordinances affect tobacco use.94
Federal bills are currently pending to increase the federal excise tax
on cigarettes from 16 cents to 32 cents per pack,95 and to ban all
print advertising of cigarettes. 96
Courts can screen design defect cases that pose process con-
cerns at either the pleading stage or the directed verdict stage. Pro-
fessor Twerski advocates the use of directed verdicts in design
litigation when significant process concerns 97 limit a court's ability
to fairly decide a case and alternative decisionmakers exist to better
evaluate product safety.9 8 The directed verdict is often the appro-
priate procedural device, according to Twerski, because courts fre-
quently need considerable factual background in order to focus on
the specific policy concerns implicated by a particular case. 99
Although the presence of policy concerns is obvious at the outset of
design defect litigation, use of the directed verdict rather than dis-
missal of the claim at the pleading stage enables a court to base its
decision on a more fully developed factual background.
Dismissal of the plaintiff's claim at the pleading stage does have
countervailing procedural advantages. If the court fails fo dismiss at
the pleading stage, the jury hears all the evidence of societal pro-
duction effects. If the court then decides not to direct a verdict for
93 If forces exist to frame the issue clearly, courts should defer to legislative action
if the legislature is better able to decide the issue. See Zacharias, The Politics of Torts, 95
YALE L. REV. 698, 727-28 (1986).
94 Friedrich, supra note 58, at 22. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-601.01
(1986) (smoking prohibited in elevators,theaters, libraries, art museums, lecture or con-
cert halls, buses, school buildings, and certain areas of health care institutions); IND.
CODE ANN. §§ 16-1-22-21, 16 6-4-23 (Burns 1983) (smoking prohibited where food is
stored); IOWA CODE ANN. § 170.19 (West 1969 & Supp. 1988) (smoking prohibited
where food is prepared or served); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-35-1(4) (1972) (smoking cigar
or pipe prohibited on passenger buses); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-10-106 (Supp. 1987)
(restricts smoking in a public place or public meeting except in designated smoking ar-
eas); FT. LAUDERDALE, FLA., CODE OF ORDINANCES § 28-80 (1975) (restricting smoking in
cafeteria lines). See generally A. BRODY & B. BRODY, THE LEGAL RIGHTS OF NONSMOKERS
102-07 (1977) (discusses state laws prohibiting smoking in specific places proposed or
enacted during 1981). See generally, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVS., STATE
LEGISLATION ON SMOKING AND HEALTH (1981).
95 S. 447, 100th Cong., 1st Sess., 133 CONG. REC. 1617-19 (1987).
96 H.R. 1272, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
97 Twerski, supra note 74, at 551. He includes in such process concerns polycentric-
ity, close risk-utility proof, state of the art and tenuous causation. Id. at 551 n.105.
98 Id. at 551. Twerski describes "alternative decisionmaking mechanisms" as in-
cluding consumer choice, cost, shifting duty, the design safety review process and legis-
lation. Id. at 551 n.106.
99 Id at 529-30.
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the defendant, the judge must instruct the jury to ignore this evi-
dence in the risk-utility evaluation of the reasonableness of the man-
ufacturer's conduct. A bifurcated trial, preventing the
misapplication of production evidence by the jury in the risk-utility
analysis, might solve this problem. However, such problems do not
arise at all when the court dismisses the claim at the pleading stage.
When a plaintiff asks a court to compare the risks and benefits
of a product with the risks and benefits of a world without the prod-
uct, a judge must assume a more active role. The court should con-
sider the process concerns that make risk-utility analysis especially
difficult in this type of case, the potential effects of a wrong decision,
and whether the legislature is better suited to address the question.
On facts similar to Cipollone a court should prevent the case from
reaching the risk-utility analysis, either through dismissal at the
pleading stage or a directed verdict for the manufacturer. 100
CONCLUSION
Courts and commentators have struggled to find ways to main-
tain judicial oversight in determining which design defect cases a
jury should decide.10 Products liability law has drawn increasing
criticism, and many states have adopted statutes designed to curb its
scope.102 These difficulties, however, do not suggest that the
100 In another development in the Cipollone litigation, the district court granted the
defendants' motion for judgment on the pleadings and dismissed the plaintiff's unrea-
sonably unsafe product risk-utility claims. Cipollone v. Liggett Group, Inc., No. 83-2864
(D.NJ. Oct. 27, 1987) (LEXIS, Genfed library, Dist file). The district court held that
recently enacted section 3(a)(2) of the Product Liability Act, 1987 NJ. Sess. Law Serv.
188-93 (Vol. 6 1987), was applicable to the Cipollone case and barred the plaintiff's risk-
utility claims as a matter of New Jersey law. Cipollone, No. 83-2864 (D.NJ. Oct. 27,
1987). The court granted the defendant's motion for partial judgment on the pleadings
with respect to the plaintiff's claim that cigarettes are an unreasonably unsafe product
under risk-utility analysis. Id.
101 See, e.g., Wade, supra note 10, at 838-39 (more judicial supervision needed be-
cause important policy issues arise when whole class of products allegedly unsafe); Note,
Products Liability-Strict Liability in Tort-State-of-the-Art Evidence Relevant to Risk-Utility
Analysis in Design Defect Cases-O'Brien v. Muskin Corp., 15 SETON HALL L. REV. 120, 141
(1984) (authored by Stephen Foley) (policy questions implicated in alleging classes of
products defective necessitate increased judicial control); Wilson v. Piper Aircraft Corp.,
282 Or. 61, 68, 577 P.2d 1322, 1326 (1978) (court reversed jury verdict for plaintiff
despite evidence of alternative feasible design, explaining that "the court is to deter-
mine, and to weigh in the balance, whether the proposed alternative design has been
shown to be practicable").
102 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 12-683(1) (1982) (manufacturer can present
defense that product conformed to state of the art at time product was first sold by the
defendant); CoLo. REV. STAT. § 13-21-403(l)(a) (1987) (rebuttable presumption of no
defect in product if design conformed to state of the art at time product was first
designed or sold); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.3200(l)(2) (Baldwin 1987) (manufacturer
can raise defense that someone other than defendant altered or modified product in
manner not reasonably foreseeable to defendant); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 99B-4 (1979) (de-
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problems facing products liability law in general and risk-utility
analysis in particular are insurmountable. Risk-utility analysis is a
tool that works well when applied to most situations where a court
compares two technologically feasible alternative designs. As the
existing product design and the proposed alternative design be-
come more dissimilar, process concerns and data-gathering difficul-
ties increase. When the comparison is between a current product
design and a world without the product, the court should consider
whether the problem is best addressed by the legislature. Evidence
of the production effects of the product not relevant to risk-utility
analysis may become relevant to a court deciding whether it is com-
petent to undertake the risk-utility analysis. In the case of ciga-
rettes, when there are significant process concerns and widespread
public debate, legislative action is preferable.
Mary Griffin
fense for unforeseeable misuse of product); N.D. CENT. CODE § 28-01.1-05 (Supp.
1987) (rebuttable presumption of no defect if product meets federal or state standards);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 29-28-105(a)-(b) (1980) (defense of no detect if product or produc-
tion process met state of the art at time of sale.); Birnbaum, Legislative Reform or Retreat?
A Response to the Product Liability Crisis, 14 FORUM 251 (1978); Symposium on Products Liability
Law: The Need for Statutory Reform, 56 N.C.L. REv. 623 (1978).
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